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ABSTRACT: N o n co o p e ra t iv e  c o l l u s i o n  i s  more l i k e l y  t o  be
s u s t a i n a b le ,  a l l  e l s e  e q u a l ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  d e g re e  o f  p r o d u c t  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .  In th e  p r e s e n c e  o f  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,  
market sh are  i s  b ia s e d  downward as an in d ex  o f  market power; I 
a n a ly z e  th e  e x t e n t  o f  th e  b i a s . The im pact o f  p r o d u c t  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  on market per form an ce  in  th e  lo n g  run depends on 
whether  f i r m s  s e t  p r i c e s  o r  q u a n t i t i e s  and on th e  e x t e n t  t o  which 
market s i z e  in c r e a s e s  as p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  in c r e a s e s .
JEL C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  Numbers: 022, 611






















































































































































































I .  I n t r o d u c t i o n 1
P ro d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,  as d e s c r ib e d  by Chamberlin  [1933 , 
p. 5 6 ] ,  i s  u b iq u i t o u s :
A g e n e r a l  c l a s s  o f  p r o d u c t  i s  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  i f  any 
s i g n i f i c a n t  b a s i s  e x i s t s  f o r  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  th e  goods  ( o r  
s e r v i c e s )  o f  one s e l l e r  from t h o s e  o f  a n o th e r .  Such a b a s i s  
may be r e a l  o r  f a n c i e d ,  so  lo n g  as i t  i s  o f  any im portan ce  
■whatever t o  b u y e r s ,  and l e a d s  t o  a p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  one 
v a r i e t y  o v e r  a n o th e r .  . . .
D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  may be based  upon c e r t a i n  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  th e  p r o d u c t  i t s e l f ,  such as e x c l u s i v e  
p a te n te d  f e a t u r e s ;  t ra d e -m a rk s ;  t r a d e  names; p e c u l i a r i t i e s  
o f  th e  package o r  c o n t a in e r ,  i f  any; o r  s i n g u l a r i t y  in  
q u a l i t y ,  d e s ig n ,  c o l o r ,  o r  s t y l e .  I t  may a l s o  e x i s t  w ith  
r e s p e c t  t o  th e  c o n d i t i o n s  su rro u n d in g  i t s  s a l e .  In r e t a i l  
t r a d e . . .  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  in c l u d e  such f a c t o r s  as the  
c o n v e n ie n c e  o f  th e  s e l l e r ’ s l o c a t i o n ,  th e  g e n e r a l  t o n e  o r  
c h a r a c t e r  o f  h i s  e s t a b l i s h m e n t ,  e f f i c i e n c y ,  and a l l  th e  
p e r s o n a l  l i n k s  which a t t a c h  h i s  custom ers  e i t h e r  t o  h im s e l f  
o r  t o  t h o s e  employed by  him. In so  f a r  as t h e s e  and o t h e r  
i n t a n g i b l e  f a c t o r s  v a ry  from s e l l e r  t o  s e l l e r ,  th e  " p r o d u c t "  
in  each  c a s e  i s  d i f f e r e n t . . .
In v iew  o f  th e  u b iq u i t y  o f  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,  i t  
b e h oov es  e c o n o m is t s  t o  understan d  th e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  p ro d u c t  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  f o r  market p e r fo r m a n c e .2 In t h i s  paper ,  I 
examine th e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  f o r  c e r t a i n  
a s p e c t s  o f  market p er form an ce  in  th e  s h o r t  run and in  th e  lo n g
I show t h a t  f o r  a g iv e n  number o f  f i r m s ,  in c r e a s e s  in 
p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  in c r e a s e  th e  l i k e l i h o o d  th a t  
n o n c o o p e r a t i v e  c o l l u s i o n  w i l l  be  s u s t a i n a b le ,  a l l  e l s e  e q u a l .  
Second, I show th a t  f o r  a f i x e d  number o f  f i r m s ,  market sh are  i s  
b ia s e d  downward, as an in d e x  o f  market power, in  th e  p r e s e n c e  o f  
p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,  and i n d i c a t e  th e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  b i a s .
1. M a te r ia l  in  S e c t i o n  I I I  appeared  in  M artin  [ 1 9 8 8 c ] .  An 
a l t e r n a t i v e  ap proach  t o  th e  m a te r ia l  t r e a t e d  in  S e c t i o n  IV 
appeared  in  M artin  [1 9 8 5 ] .
2. For a r e c e n t  su rve y  o f  th e  l i t e r a t u r e  on p r o d u c t  




























































































T h ird ,  I show t h a t  in  th e  lo n g  run th e  im pact o f  p r o d u c t  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  on market p er form an ce  depends on th e  e x t e n t  t o  
which  market s i z e  i n c r e a s e s  as p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  i n c r e a s e s .
I I .  P ro d u c t  D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  and N o n -c o o p e r a t iv e  C o l lu s io n
A. M odelin g  P ro d u c t  D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n
I t  i s  n a tu r a l  t o  ap proach  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  by 
g e n e r a l i z i n g  a model o f  h om ogeneou s-p rod u ct  o l i g o p o l y .  An 
o b v io u s  s t a r t i n g  p o in t  (Spence  [1 9 7 6 a ] ;  C arruth  [1 9 7 8 ] ;  Waterson 
[1 9 8 3 ] ;  Deneckere  [1 9 8 3 ] ;  M ajerus [ 1 9 8 8 ] ) ,  i s  th e  Cournot model 
o f  q u a n t i t y - s e t t i n g  o l i g o p o l y  w ith  s ta n d a r d iz e d  p r o d u c t s .
Suppose n f i r m s  o p e r a t e  in  a market w ith  l i n e a r  in v e r s e  
demand cu rv e
(1) p = a -  bQ = a -  * q2 * -  * q^ •
Then a u n i t  o f  o u tp u t  o f  any v a r i e t y  i s  a p e r f e c t  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  
a u n i t  o f  ou tp u t  o f  any o t h e r  v a r i e t y .  I f  each  f i r m  o p e r a t e s  
w ith  c o n s t a n t  av erag e  and m a rg in a l c o s t  c  a n a tu r a l  measure o f  
market s i z e  i s
(2) S -  ,
th e  q u a n t i ty  w hich  would be demanded i f  p r i c e  were equ a l t o  
m arg in a l c o s t .
In c o n t r a s t  t o  ( 1 ) ,  i f  v a r i e t i e s  o f  a p r o d u c t  group  a re  
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d ,  th e y  a re  im p e r f e c t  s u b s t i t u t e s .  Each v a r i e t y  has 
i t s  own i n v e r s e  demand c u r v e .  S a le  o f  an a d d i t i o n a l  u n i t  o f  
o t h e r  v a r i e t i e s  sh ou ld  have a s m a l le r  e f f e c t  on pi than s a l e  o f  
a d d i t i o n a l  u n i t  o f  v a r i e t y  i .  These i n t u i t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  can 
be  ca p tu r e d  by m o d i fy in g  t h e  i n v e r s e  demand cu r v e  (3 )  t o  a system





























































































£33 p( -  a -  b(q( + Ojf^q) * a " *>4, + (n ~ 1)9^ ,1 , i -  1,2, ...jn.
Ĵ i
where p( is the price of variety i, q( is output of variety i, t is the 
average output of all other firms, and 0 is a product differentiation 
parameter which converts units of output of other varieties into 
an "equivalent" number of units of output of variety i.
Let 0 < 8 < 1. 0 = 1  corresponds to the homogeneous
product case, while products are completely differentiated if 
8 -  0.3
Provided that all prices are nonnegative,4 the demand curve
3. 0 < 0 would model complementary goods. In the most 
general case, one could specify a parameter 0,j as the 
coefficient of variety j in variety i's inverse demand equation.
This is sensible for empirical work (Martin 1988b) but too 
general for analytical tractability. In such a model,
0(j > 1 could be interpreted as case in which variety j 
were of higher quality than variety i.
4. The c a s e  in  which  th e  n o n n e g a t iv i t y  c o n s t r a i n t  a p p l i e s  i s  




























































































f o r  v a r i e t y  i  im p l ie d  by (3 )  i s 5. 6
™  %  ‘  i VTnL - T1e F  {  a -  II Pt * - T ^ P ,  -  W ]  }
where p - is the industry-average price. Thus demand for variety
i  i s  i n v e r s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  i t s  own p r i c e  and t o  th e  e x c e s s  o f  i t s  
own p r i c e  o v e r  th e  in d u s t r y  averag e  p r i c e .
I t  i s  c o n v e n ie n t  t o  use  r e a c t i o n  c u r v e s  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  
s i n g l e - p e r i o d  Nash e q u i l i b r iu m ,  j o i n t  p r o f i t  m a x im iza t ion ,  and 
th e  t e m p ta t io n  t o  d e p a rt  from a n o n c o o p e r a t i v e  j o i n t - p r o f i t -  
m axim izing  c o n f i g u r a t i o n .
B. N o n - c o o p e r a t iv e  S i n g l e - p e r i o d  E q u i l ib r iu m
Q u a n t i t y - S e t t in g  Firms
The in v e r s e  demand cu r v e  (3 )  g i v e s  th e  p r i c e  o f  v a r i e t y  i  
when a l l  p r i c e s  a re  n o n n e g a t iv e .  When t h i s  c o n d i t i o n  i s  met, th e  
e q u a t io n  o f  f i r m  i ’ s r e a c t i o n  cu rv e  i s
5. Write the system of inverse demand equations as 
p -  aJ -  b [ C1 -  6)1 ♦ 0JJ']q
where J in an n x 1 column vector of ones and I the n x n 
identify matrix. The inverse of the matrix in brackets on the 
right is
r ^ e t 1 - 1 * ft? - neJJ‘ ]
and the solution for the demand equations follows.
6. Written in this form, the demand curve is strikingly similar 
to those of the Shubik [1980, p. 89]
q, = -  P ^ p ,  * yCp, -  t o ]  }  •
By introducing the constant ^ , Shubik maintains a 




























































































(5) 2q( -  0J§ 1 qj = S . i = l,2,...jn
V i
For g r a p h i c a l  p u rp o s e s ,  i t  i s  c o n v e n ie n t  t o  con d en se  th e  
e q u a t io n s  o f  th e  in v e r s e  demand c u rv e s  and r e a c t i o n  c u r v e s  from n 
arguments t o  2. Su ppos in g  t h a t  a l l  f i r m s  e x c e p t  f i r m  1 s e t  a 
common ou tp u t  and p r i c e ,  th e  condensed  i n v e r s e  demand c u r v e s  a re
(6a) p, -  a -  b[q] + (n - neq.,1
(6b) p -  a -  b {[l  + (n -  2)8]q
where the subscript 1 refers to firm 1 and the subscript -1 
refers to the common value of output or price for all other 
firms. From (6a) and (6b), the regions in which p] and p are 
nonnegative are
(7a) s * b -  qi * (n " 130tI_1
and
(7b) S ♦ g- > [1 ♦ (n -  2)6]q ♦ 6q
r e s p e c t i v e l y .
From ( 6 ) ,  th e  e q u a t io n s  o f  th e  con d en sed  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n s ,  
p r o v id e d  a l l  p r i c e s  a re  n o n n e g a t iv e ,  a re  
(8a) 2q( + (n -  l)8q -  S
(8b) 6qi -  [2 ♦ (n -  2}8]q - S .
The reaction curves and borders of the nonnegative price 
regions are graphed in Figure 1. For concreteness, consider firm 
l ' s  output decision. As q j rises from 0, firm l 's  profit - 



























































































Figure 1: Quantity Reaction Curves
q - i
Notes: drawn for three firms, a -  10, b • c l, e 34
th e  i n t e r s e c t i o n  o f  (8 a )  and th e  b o r d e r  o f  ( 7 b ) ,  f i r m  1 i s  no 
l o n g e r  a b l e  t o  move a lo n g  ( 8 a ) ;  t o  do so  would  make p- 1  n e g a t iv e .  
As q - i  r i s e s  from  t h i s  p o i n t ,  f i r m  1 i s  c o n s t r a in e d  t o  move a lo n g  
th e  b o r d e r  o f  ( 7 b ) .  C o rre sp o n d in g  t o  t h i s  k in k  in  f i r m  l ’ s 
r e a c t i o n  cu r v e  i s  a k in k  in  f i r m  l ’ s r e s i d u a l  demand c u r v e . 7 In 
l i k e  manner, t h e r e  i s  a k in k  in  th e  co n d en sed  r e a c t i o n  cu rve  o f  
a l l  o t h e r  f i r m s ,  a t  th e  where f u r t h e r  movement a l o n g  the  
u n c o n s t r a in e d  r e a c t i o n  cu rv e  would make pi n e g a t iv e .
7. D eneck ere  [1 9 8 4 ] ;  Majerus [1 9 8 8 ] .  F or  s i m p l i c i t y ,  I suppose 
in  t h i s  s e c t i o n  o f  th e  paper  th a t  f i x e d  c o s t s  a re  z e r o .  I f  n o t ,  
f i r m s  may shut down e i t h e r  a lo n g  th e  u n c o n s t r a in e d  r e a c t i o n  cu rve  
o r  a l o n g  th e  p r i c e - n e g a t i v i t y  c o n s t r a i n t .  I f  f i x e d  c o s t s  are  




























































































The sym m etric  s i n g l e - p e r i o d  Nash e q u i l ib r iu m  o c c u r s  a t  th e  
i n t e r s e c t i o n  o f  th e  two k inked  r e a c t i o n  c u r v e s .  E q u i l ib r iu m  
v a lu e s  a r e  (C a rru th  [1 9 7 8 ] ;  M ajerus [1 9 8 8 ] )
(93 Pnq - c - 2 ♦ tnS- 1)6 ‘’nq = 2 + (if - 1)0 "nq = b [  2 ♦ (if - 1)0 ]
P r i c e - S e t t i n g  Firms
From e q u a t io n  ( 4 ) ,  when a l l  q u a n t i t i e s  a re  n o n n e g a t iv e  in  
th e  f l e x i b l e - s i z e  model,  th e  e q u a t io n  o f  f i r m  i ’ s p r i c e  r e a c t i o n  
cu r v e  i s
(10) 2! 1 ♦ (n -  2)0Kpt -  c) -  (1 - 0)bS -  (n -  l )0 (p_( -  c) .
Condensing  demand c u r v e s  t o  two arguments, th e  r e g io n s  in  
which  q u a n t i t i e s  are  n o n p o s i t i v e  a re  g iv e n  by 
(11a) [1 * (n -  2)0](p] -  c) > (1 -  0)bS * (n -  l)8(p_] -  c)
( l ib )  p_j -  c > (1 -  0)bS ♦ 0(pt -  c) .
Firm 1 i s  a m o n o p o l i s t  on th e  b o r d e r  o f  th e  r e g io n  d e s c r i b e d  by 
( l i b ) .  A l l  o t h e r  f i r m s  have a j o i n t  monopoly -  f i r m  1 i s  o u t  o f  
th e  market -  on th e  b o r d e r  o f  th e  r e g io n  d e s c r i b e d  by (1 1 a ) .  As 
m ight be  e x p e c t e d ,  th e  b o r d e r s  o f  t h e s e  r e g i o n s  i n t e r s e c t  where 
pi = p - i  = a, th e  p r i c e s  which  make a l l  q u a n t i t i e s  demanded equ al 
t o  z e r o .
The e q u a t io n s  o f  th e  condensed  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n s ,  p r o v id e d  
q u a n t i t i e s  a re  n o n n e g a t iv e ,  are
(12a) 2(1 * (n -  2)0](p -  c) = (1 - 0)bS * (n -  l)0(p -  c)




























































































F ig u r e  2: P r i c e  R e a c t io n  Curves
p - 1 pm
3Notes: drawn for three firms, a -  10, b - c  -  1, 0 -  jj-
The u n c o n s t r a in e d  r e a c t i o n  c u r v e s  and monopoly l i n e s  are  
g raphed  in  F ig u r e  2. For i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  c o n s i d e r  th e  p r i c e  
d e c i s i o n  o f  f i r m  1. As p - i  r i s e s  from z e r o ,  f i r m  l ’ s p r o f i t -  
m axim iz in g  p r i c e  r i s e s  a lo n g  i t s  u n c o n s t r a in e d  r e a c t i o n  c u r v e .  
When p - 1  r e a c h e s  th e  l e v e l  a t  which  th e  u n c o n s tr a in e d  r e a c t i o n  




























































































From t h i s  p o i n t ,  f i r m  1 can n o t  move a lo n g  i t s  u n c o n s tr a in e d  
r e a c t i o n  c u r v e ;  t o  do so  would r e q u i r e  q - i  t o  become negatives.
Nor can f i r m  1 ch a rg e  th e  monopoly p r i c e ,  which  would move the  
market ba ck  i n t o  th e  r e g i o n  in  which  q - 1 i s  p o s i t i v e .  From the  
i n t e r s e c t i o n  o f  th e  two l i n e s ,  f i r m  l ’ s p r o f i t - m a x im iz in g  c o u r s e  
i s  t o  r a i s e  p r i c e  a lo n g  th e  q - l  = 0  l i n e ,  u n t i l  pi e q u a ls  the  
monopoly p r i c e .  I f  p - 1 were t o  r i s e  from t h i s  p o i n t  (a l th o u g h  
q - l  would remain f i x e d  a t  z e r o )  f i r m  l ’ s p r o f i t - m a x i m i z i n g  p r i c e  
would remain th e  monopoly  p r i c e .  There a re  th u s two k in k s  in  
f i r m  l ’ s r e a c t i o n  c u r v e ,  th e  f i r s t  when o u tp u t  o f  a l l  o t h e r  f i r m s  
f a l l s  t o  z e r o  and th e  secon d  when f ir m  l ’ s c o n s t r a in e d  p r o f i t -  
m axim izing  p r i c e  r e a c h e s  th e  monopoly p r i c e .  The condensed  
r e a c t i o n  cu r v e  o f  a l l  o t h e r  f i r m s  has a s i m i l a r  shape.
The sym m etric  s i n g l e - p e r i o d  e q u i l ib r iu m  o c c u r s  at  th e  
i n t e r s e c t i o n  o f  th e  two k inked  r e a c t i o n  c u r v e s .  E q u i l ib r iu m  
v a lu e s  a re  (M ajerus [1 9 8 8 ] )
.  (1 -  6)bS „ .  1 -  (n -  2)9 S
c ■ 2 + (n -  3)6 ‘Vb * 1 + £n - lie 2 ♦ (n -  3)0
(13)
nb -  (1 -  6)b
1 ♦ (n 
1 ♦ (n M l - r (n -  3)0 ] ’  •
C. J o i n t - P r o f i t  M ax im ization
The j o i n t - p r o f i t  m axim izing  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  i s
p, -  c -  AbSrJJIm 2
1
(14)
4jnrn 1 ♦ On -  1)0 2
. 2
'‘him i ♦ Cn -  1)6 ( ! )
From e q u a t io n  ( 3 ) ,  e q u i l ib r iu m  ou tp u t  o f  a l l  v a r i e t i e s  i s  
e q u iv a l e n t  t o  an o u tp u t  o f





























































































u n i t s  o f  v a r i e t y  i .  But t h i s  i s  monopoly o u tp u t  in  a market w ith  
s ta n d a r d iz e d  p r o d u c t s .  When p r o d u c t s  a re  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d ,  j o i n t  
p r o f i t s  a re  maximized i f  th e  e q u iv a l e n t  ou tp u t  o f  each  v a r i e t y  
e q u a ls  th e  s t a n d a r d iz e d - p r o d u c t  monopoly l e v e l  o f  o u tp u t .
In F ig u re  1, th e  j o i n t - p r o f i t  m axim izing  ou tp u t  p a i r  l i e s  on 
a 45° l i n e  th ro u g h  th e  o r i g i n ,  c l o s e r  t o  th e  o r i g i n  than th e  
s i n g l e - p e r i o d  N ash-Cournot o u tp u t  p a i r .  In F ig u r e  2, th e  j o i n t -  
p r o f i t  m axim izing  p r i c e  p a i r  l i e s  on a 45° l i n e  th rou g h  th e  
o r i g i n ,  a t  th e  i n t e r s e c t i o n  o f  th e  two monopoly  p r i c e  l i n e s ,  
f a r t h e r  from th e  o r i g i n  than th e  s i n g l e - p e r i o d  N ash-Bertrand 
p r i c e  p a i r .
D. P ro d u c t  D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  and th e  S t a b i l i t y  o f  N o n co o p e ra t iv e
C o l l u s i o n 8 9
I examine h e re  th e  im pact o f  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  on th e  
s t a b i l i t y  o f  n o n c o o p e r a t i v e  c o l l u s i o n  su p p o r te d  by t r i g g e r  
s t r a t e g i e s  o f  th e  k in d  a n a ly ze d  by Friedman [1 9 7 1 ] .  In a 
re p e a te d  game, f i r m s  a re  tem pted t o  c h e a t  from  a s i n g l e - p e r i o d  
j o i n t - p r o f i t  m axim izing  c o n f i g u r a t i o n .  The b e n e f i t  from c h e a t in g  
i s  th e  o n e - p e r i o d  g a in  in  p r o f i t .  I f  c h e a t in g  o c c u r s ,  o t h e r  
f i r m s  r e v e r t  t o  th e  n o n c o o p e r a t i v e  Nash e q u i l i b r iu m .  The c o s t  o f  
c h e a t in g  i s  t h e r e f o r e  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  between th e  p r e s e n t -  
d is c o u n te d  v a lu e s  o f  t h e  j o i n t - p r o f i t  m axim izing  and Nash 
e q u i l ib r iu m  income s t r e a m s .8 The c o s t  o f  s t r a y i n g  from th e
8. A l lo w in g  f o r  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  n o t a t i o n ,  th e  s t a b i l i t y  
c o n d i t i o n s  r e p o r t e d  h ere  a re  f u n c t i o n a l l y  e q u iv a l e n t  t o  t h o s e  o f  
M ajerus [1 9 8 8 ] ,  who w r i t e s  th e  s t a b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n s  in  term s o f  
th e  d i s c o u n t  f a c t o r  r a t h e r  than  th e  in v e r s e  o f  th e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e .  
M ajerus does  n o t  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  th e  s t a b i l i t y  
c o n d i t i o n  t o  changes  in  th e  d e g re e  o f  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .
9. There a r e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  o t h e r  s t r a t e g i e s  which  may su p p o r t  
n o n c o o p e r a t i v e ly  c o l l u s i v e  e q u i l i b r i a ;  see  Friedman [1986 ] and 




























































































j o i n t - p r o f i t  m axim izing  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  w i l l  e x ce e d  th e  b e n e f i t  
and n o n c o o p e r a t i v e  c o l l u s i o n  w i l l  be  s t a b l e  -  i f
(19) 1_ ^ ^ i.ch eat "  
r n lj7tm “ n l.nash
where r  i s  th e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  used t o  d i s c o u n t  f u t u r e  income.
Q u a n t i t y - S e t t in g  Firms
In th e  q u a n t i t y - s e t t i n g  m odel,  f i r m  l ’ s i n d iv id u a l  p r o f i t  
m axim izing  o u tp u t ,  i f  a l l  o t h e r  f i r m s  p rod u ce  th e  j o i n t - p r o f i t  
m axim izing  o u tp u t ,  i s  g iv e n  by f i r m  l ’ s u n c o n s tr a in e d  r e a c t i o n  
c u r v e .  Firm l ’ s r e s u l t i n g  p r i c e ,  o u tp u t ,  and p r o f i t  a re
(17)
„  „ 2 * (n -  1)6 bS _ 2 ♦ (n -  1)8 S
^q,ch 1 +■ (n -  1)8 4 ^q.ch Ï + (n -  1 )8 4
„  I [ 2 * (n -  1)8 S I 2
"q.ch b L 1 * (n -  1)8 4 J
S u b s t i t u t i n g  ( 9 ) ,  ( 1 4 ) ,  and (1 7 )  in  ( 1 6 ) ,  n o n c o o p e r a t i v e
c o l l u s i o n  can be su p p o r te d  by r e v e r s i o n  t o  th e  Nash-Cournot 
e q u i l i b r iu m  i f
------ 1 1 [2 + Cn -  1)8]2
C18) r  2- 4 i + h  -  i le ■
The derivative of the fraction on the right with respect to 8 is 
(19) | ( 2 * ( n -  ^ [ l + V -  1)8 j '  » 0 '
As product differentiation increases, 8 falls, and the 
right-hand side of (18) becomes smaller. It follows that for a 
given interest rate and number of firms, noncooperative collusion 
is more like to be stable -  inequality (18) is more likely to be 




























































































P r i c e - S e t t i n g  Firms
I f  a l l  o t h e r  f i r m s  s e t  th e  j o i n t - p r o f i t  m axim izing  p r i c e ,  
f i r m  1 w i l l  maximize i t ’ s in d i v i d u a l  p r o f i t  by lo w e r in g  p r i c e  
a lo n g  i t s  r e a c t i o n  c u r v e .  T h is  may mean s e t t i n g  a p r i c e  a lo n g  
th e  u n c o n s tr a in e d  r e a c t i o n  c u r v e ,  o r  i t  may mean s e t t i n g  a p r i c e  
a lo n g  th e  q - l  = 0  l i n e .  A d e f e c t i n g  f i r m  1 w i l l  f a l l  back  on th e  
q - l  = 0 l i n e  i f  th e  j o i n t - p r o f i t  m axim izing  p r i c e  i s  g r e a t e r  than 
th e  v e r t i c a l - a x i s  c o o r d i n a t e  o f  th e  f i r s t  k in k  in  i t s  r e a c t i o n  
c u r v e .  O th erw ise ,  i t  w i l l  d e f e c t  t o  th e  u n c o n s tr a in e d  r e a c t i o n  
c u r v e .
D e f e c t i o n  t o  th e  u n c o n s t r a in e d  r e a c t i o n  cu rv e
I f  f i r m  1 s e t s  p r i c e  a l o n g  i t s  u n c o n s tr a in e d  r e a c t i o n  c u r v e ,  
w h i le  a l l  o t h e r  f i r m s  s e t  th e  j o i n t - p r o f i t  m axim izing  p r i c e ,  i t s  
s i n g l e - p e r i o d  p r i c e ,  o u tp u t ,  and p r o f i t  a re
f?0 )
r p,ch.rf
2 -  [n -  3)6 bS 
1 + (n -  2)0 4
„ 2 -  (n -  3)6 1 S
S .ch .ri '  1 ♦ (n -  1 )6  1 - 6 4
{ [ 2  ♦ £n - 3 ) 6 ] | } ‘
"p.ch.rf "  1 -  6 [1 * (n -  1)6](1 * Cn -  2)6]
S u b s t i t u t i n g  ( 1 3 ) ,  ( 1 4 ) ,  and (2 0 )  in  ( 1 6 ) ,  n o n c o o p e r a t i v e
c o l l u s i o n  can be  su p p o r te d  by r e v e r s i o n  t o  th e  N ash-Bertrand 
e q u i l ib r iu m  i f
( 2 1 ) 1  > i  1r -  4 1 - 0
[2 M n  - 3)6]2
1 + (n -  2)6
The derivative of the term on the right in (21) with respect 
to 6 is
2
( 22 ) 12 ♦ (n -  3)0]| ( (1
n -  1_________
0)[1 * (n -  2)6], > 0.
Once again, decreases in 0 make it more likely that the




























































































D e f e c t i o n  t o  th e  r iv a l - s h u td o w n  cu rv e
A d e f e c t i n g  f i r m  1 w i l l  s e t  p r i c e  a lo n g  th e  r i v a l  shutdown
l i n e  i f  
(23) n - 1
(3n -  5)
As n goes to infinity, (23) approaches, from above, the condition 
0 > 2/3. Thus if a defecting firm fails back to the rival shutdown 
line, 0 is greater than 2/3.
I f  a l l  o t h e r  f i r m s  s e t  th e  j o i n t - p r o f i t  m axim iz ing  p r i c e ,  
and f i r m  1 p r i c e s  a lo n g  th e  q - 1  = 0  l i n e ,  i t s  p r i c e ,  o u tp u t ,  and
s i n g l e - p e r i o d  p r o f i t  are
(24)
Pp.ch.rsd
29 - 1 bS
‘  e 2
JL
20
“ p.ch.rsd ■ (20 * ” b( â ]
2where the fact that 0 > ensures that price is 
greater than marginal cost and economic profit is positive.
In t h i s  c a s e ,  n o n c o o p e r a t i v e  c o l l u s i o n  w i l l  be  su p p o r te d  i f
(25) i  > [(2n -  3)02 - (n -  3)0 -  1][2 + Cn - 3)0i2 
r “  (n -  I )2©4
The derivative of the right-hand side of (25) with respect
0 is 
(26) [2 ♦ (n -  3)9ianz -  14n ♦ 21)6Z * 8(n -  3)8 ♦ 8) 
On -  1)205
(26) is generally of ambiguous sign, although positive for n 
> 5. For n < 5, (26) is positive for 0 near j ,  but becomes 




























































































In price-setting oligopoly, increases in product 
differentiation increase the likelihood that noncooperative 
collusion will be stable, provided rivals would remain in 
operation after defection. Even if defection would induce rivals 
to shut down, increases in product differentiation make stability 
more likely if there are five or more firms (and perhaps with
2fewer firms, if 8 is not too much greater than ^0.
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n
The t r a d i t i o n a l  i n d u s t r i a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  a n a l y s i s  o f  p r o d u c t  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  and c o l l u s i o n  i s  t h a t  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  
makes c o l l u s i o n  more d i f f i c u l t ,  a l l  e l s e  e q u a l .  In  th e  p r e s e n c e  
o f  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,  c a r t e l  members w i l l  have t o  ag re e  on 
p r i c e  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  n o t  j u s t  a s i n g l e  c o l l u s i v e  p r i c e  l e v e l .  
A n e c d o ta l  and e p i s o d i c  r e a l - w o r l d  e v id e n c e  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  
t h i s  a n a l y s i s  (M artin  [ 1 9 8 9 ] ) .
Combined w ith  th e  r e s u l t s  p r e s e n te d  ab ove ,  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
a n a l y s i s  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  a f f e c t s  th e  
r e a c h in g  and th e  s u s t a i n in g  o f  c o l l u s i v e  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  in  
fu n d a m en ta l ly  d i f f e r e n t  ways. P ro d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  r e d u ce s  
th e  in cr e m e n ta l  p r o f i t  t o  be  had by d e p a r t in g  from a j o i n t - p r o f i t  
m axim ising  c o n f i g u r a t i o n ,  beca u se  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  
i n s u l a t e s  r i v a l s ’ markets and r e d u ce s  th e  e x t e n t  t o  which  a 
s i n g l e  f i r m  can lu r e  r i v a l s ’ cu s tom ers  i n t o  i t s  own market. 
A lth ough  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  makes i t  h ard er  t o  a c h ie v e  a 
c o l l u s i v e  c o n f i g u r a t i o n ,  on ce  such a c o n f i g u r a t i o n  i s  rea ch e d ,  




























































































I I I .  Market Share as an Index o f  Market Power in  th e  P re se n ce  o f  
P ro d u c t  D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n
A. P o l i c y  Background
In p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s ,  market share  i s  commonly employed as an 
in d e x  o f  market o r  monopoly power. T h is  i s  c l e a r l y  th e  c a s e  w ith  
U.S. a n t i t r u s t  p o l i c y ,  from th e  e a r l i e s t  d e c i s i o n s  t o  the  
p r e s e n t .
In th e  U .S . S t e e l  c a s e ,  a m a jo r i t y  o f  th e  Supreme Court
p o in t e d  t o  a d e c l i n e  in  market share  as a f a c t o r  in  th e
c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  U.S. S t e e l  was n o t  g u i l t y  o f  m o n o p o l i s a t i o n  w ith
th e  meaning o f  S e c t i o n  2 o f  th e  Sherman A n t i t r u s t  A c t . 10 The
r o l e  o f  market sh are  in  S e c t i o n  2 c a s e s  i s  emphasized by Judge
Hand’ s o f t - q u o t e d  A lc o a  g u i d e l i n e  t h a t 11
That p e r c e n t a g e  [ n in e t y ]  i s  enough t o  c o n s t i t u t e  a m onopoly ; 
i t  i s  d o u b t f u l  whether s i x t y  o r  s i x t y - f o u r  p e r c e n t  would be 
enough; and c e r t a i n l y  t h i r t y - t h r e e  p e r c e n t  i s  n o t .
Market sh are  l i k e w i s e  p la y s  an im p ortan t  r o l e  th e  treatm en t
o f  mergers under th e  C e l l e r - K e f a u v e r  A c t .  Brown S h o e 's 12 i s  on
th e  p o s t -m e r g e r  market sh ares  in  v a r io u s  l o c a l  g e o g r a p h ic
m arkets.  The d e s ig n a t i o n  o f  market share  as th e  c r i t i c a l  e lem ent
in  th e  d ia g n o s i s  o f  market power under S e c t i o n  7 o f  th e  C lay ton
A ct i s  made e x p l i c i t  in  P h i la d e lp h ia  N a t io n a l  Bank’ 13
10. U.S. v .  U n ited  S t a t e s  S t e e l  C o r p o r a t io n ,  251 U.S. 417 
(1 9 2 0 ) ,  p. 439, f o o t n o t e  1 (q u o t in g  Judge W o o l l e y ’ s D i s t r i c t  
Court o p i n i o n ) .
11. U.S. v .  Aluminum Company o f  America , 148 F. 2d 416 (2d C i r .  
1 9 4 5 ) ,  p. 424.
12. Brown Shoe C o . ,  I n c .  v .  U .S . ,  370 U.S. 294 (1 9 6 2 ) ;  see  pp. 
342-344 .





























































































We noted In Brown Shoe...that "[t]he dominant theme 
pervading congressional consideration of the 1950 amendments 
(to S 7] was a fear of what was considered to be a rising 
tide of economic concentration in the American economy."
This intense congressional concern with the trend toward 
concentration warrants dispensing, in certain cases, with 
elaborate proof of market structure, market behavior, or 
probable anticompetitive effects. Specifically, we think 
that a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue 
percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a 
significant increase in the concentration of firms in the 
market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition 
substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of 
evidence clearly showing that the market is not likely to 
have such an anticompetitive effects.
Market share  h o ld s  a s i m i l a r l y  c e n t r a l  r o l e  in  th e  a n a l y s i s
o f  market power under o t h e r  U.S. a n t i t r u s t  s t a t u t e s .  Thus, from
a r e c e n t  d e c i s i o n  i n v o l v i n g  an a l l e g a t i o n  o f  t y i n g  in  v i o l a t i o n
o f  S e c t i o n  1 o f  t h e  Sherman A c t : 14
Seven ty  p e r  c e n t  o f  th e  p a t i e n t s  r e s i d i n g  in  J e f f e r s o n  
P a r is h  e n t e r  h o s p i t a l s  o th e r  than E ast J e f f e r s o n .  . . .T h u s  
E ast J e f f e r s o n ’ s "dom inance" o v e r  p e r so n s  r e s i d i n g  in  
J e f f e r s o n  P a r is h  i s  f a r  from overw helm ing. The f a c t  t h a t  a 
s u b s t a n t i a l  m a jo r i t y  o f  th e  p a r i s h ’ s r e s i d e n t s  e l e c t  n o t  t o  
e n te r  E ast  J e f f e r s o n  means t h a t  th e  g e o g r a p h ic  data  does  n o t  
e s t a b l i s h  th e  k in d  o f  dominant market p o s i t i o n  t h a t  o b v ia t e s  
th e  need f o r  f u r t h e r  in q u ir y  i n t o  a c t u a l  c o m p e t i t i v e  
c o n d i t i o n s .
Market share  has thus assumed th e  prim ary -  one might even 
say dominant -  p o s i t i o n  in  th e  a n a l y s i s  o f  market power under th e  
U.S. a n t i t r u s t  laws.
B. R e la te d  T o p ic s
The c e n t r a l  r o l e  o f  market sh are  in  th e  a n a l y s i s  o f  market 
power under th e  a n t i t r u s t  laws has l e n t  g r e a t  im p ortan ce  t o  th e  
p r o c e s s  o f  market d e f i n i t i o n .  A v a r i e t y  o f  ad h o c  s tan d ard s  have
14. J e f f e r s o n  P a r is h  H o s p i ta l  D i s t r i c t  No. 2 v .  Hyde, 104 S .C t .  
1551 (1 9 8 4 ) ,  p. 1566. A f o o t n o t e ,  o m it te d  h e r e ,  c i t e s  d e c i s i o n s  
in  which  market sh a re s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h o s e  in v o lv e d  in  J e f f e r s o n  
P a r is h  were taken t o  i n d i c a t e  th e  l i k e l y  a b sen ce  o f  




























































































been used f o r  market d e f i n i t i o n , 15 and econ om ic  a p p ro a ch e s ,  
i n c o r p o r a t e d  in  r e c e n t  Department o f  J u s t i c e  Merger G u id e l in e s ,  
have a l s o  been  s u g g e s te d  (Boyer  [ 1 9 7 9 ] ) .  So lo n g  as market share  
i s  th e  pr im ary  in d e x  o f  market power in  a n t i t r u s t  c a s e s ,  market 
d e f i n i t i o n  i s  c r i t i c a l  t o  th e  p r o c e s s  and th e  r e s u l t .  But th e  
argument made be lo w  -  t h a t  market sh are  i s  b ia s e d  downward as an 
in d ex  o f  market power in  th e  p r e s e n c e  o f  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  
-  h o ld s  even i f  p r o d u c t  and g e o g r a p h ic  markets a re  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  
d e f i n e d .  I t h e r e f o r e  l e a v e  a s id e  th e  q u e s t i o n  o f  market 
d e f i n i t i o n .
E con om is ts  have  a l s o  d eb ated  th e  s u f f i c i e n c y  o f  market share  
as an in d e x  o f  market p o w e r .16 E con om ists  a g re e  t h a t  f a c t o r s  
o t h e r  than market sh are  ought in  p r i n c i p l e  t o  be  in c o r p o r a t e d  in  
th e  a n a l y s i s  o f  market power, bu t  d i s a g r e e  on th e  com peten ce  o f  
c o u r t s  t o  e v a lu a t e  e n t r y  c o n d i t i o n s  and th e  f o r c e  o f  p o t e n t i a l  
c o m p e t i t i o n .  T h is  i s  an im p o rta n t  d e b a te ,  and one  t o  which  in  
th e  end th e  a n a l y s i s  p r e s e n te d  h e re  may have some r e l e v a n c e .  For 
t h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  I examine th e  use o f  market sh are  as an index  o f  
market pow er,  h o ld in g  a l l  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  c o n s t a n t .
15. See E l z in g a ,  Kenneth G. and H ogarty ,  Thomas F. [19 73 ,  1978 ],
16. See Landes, W il l ia m  M. and P osn er ,  R ich ard  A. "Market Power 
in  A n t i t r u s t  C a s e s , "  [1 9 8 1 ] ,  and f o u r  comments in  th e  June 1982
i s s u e  o f  th e  Harvard..Law.Review, p a r t i c u l a r l y  S ch m alen see ’ s
[1982 , pp. 1799 -180 0 ]  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .  See 




























































































C. Market Share and Market Power 
S ta n d a r d is e d  P r o d u c ts 1 7
With demand cu r v e  ( 1 ) ,  th e  q u a n t i t y  s u p p l i e d  t o  th e  market 
can be w r i t t e n 17 8
(27) -  Q = q, * CL,
w ith  qi th e  q u a n t i ty  s u p p l i e d  by  f i r m  1 and Q- 1 th e  t o t a l  
q u a n t i ty  s u p p l i e d  by a l l  o t h e r  f i r m s .  Because th e  s l o p e  o f  th e  
in v e r s e  demand cu rv e  i s  - b ,  th e  p r i c e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand a t  any 
p o in t  a lo n g  th e  demand cu r v e  i s
(2 8  ̂ eQp = bSj'
The demand cu r v e  i s
(29) o - q, 7 0-, " 5-^ -E
and i t  i s  t h i s  t o t a l  q u a n t i t y ,  qi + Q - l , which i s  used t o  compute 
th e  market sh ares  o f  in d i v i d u a l  f i r m s  a t  any p r i c e  p.
Firm l ’ s c o n j e c t u r a l  m a rg in a l revenue i s  
(30) MR, -  p -  b(qi + ctQ.,)
where
(31) ±  30-, 0-, 3q,
i s  f i r m  l ’ s e x p e c t e d  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  o t h e r  f i r m s ’ o u tp u t  w ith  
r e s p e c t  t o  f i r m  l ’ s o u tp u t .  To maximize p r o f i t ,  f i r m  1 w i l l  
s e l e c t  an ou tp u t  which  e q u a te s  i t s  m arg in a l c o s t  t o  i t s  
c o n j e c t u r a l  m a rg in a l reven ue ,  s o  t h a t
17. See C larke  and D avies  [1 9 8 2 ] .
18. N e i t h e r  l i n e a r i t y  o f  th e  demand cu r v e  n o r  th e  assum ption  o f  




























































































(32) p -  b(q( + aQ_,) = c,
S u b s t i t u t i n g  ( 2 8 ) .  t h i s  becomes th e  f a m i l i a r 13
(33)
p -  c, a * (1 -  a)s, 
P ‘ bp
Market share  si i s
(34)
0 -,
In t h i s  model,  th e  f i r m - s p e c i f i c  d e g re e  o f  market power i s  
f u n c t i o n  o f  market s h a r e ,  c o n j e c t u r a l  v a r i a t i o n s ,  and th e  p r i c e  
e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand.
D i f f e r e n t i a t e d  P r o d u c ts
Now l e t  in v e r s e  demand be g iv e n  by e q u a t io n  ( 3 ) ,  so that, i t  
r e f e r s  t o  th e  v a r i e t y  produced  by f i r m  1 a l o n e ,  f o r  which the  
v a r i e t i e s  p rod u ced  by o t h e r  f i r m s  a re  o n ly  im p e r f e c t  s u b s t i t u t e s
For 6 between zero and 1, other varieties are equivalent 
to something less than one unit of variety 1. Although firm 1 
produces but one of a number of differentiated and competing 
varieties, the demand curve (3) is formally equivalent to that 
faced by a firm producing a standardized product In a market with 
effective demand
(35) oca) -  q, + so . ,  -  3 b P‘-
The p r i c e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  e f f e c t i v e  demand a t  any p o i n t  on t h i s  
demand cu r v e  i s  19
19. For  f u n c t i o n a l l y  e q u iv a l e n t  e x p r e s s i o n s  which  g iv e  th e  f i r m  
s p e c i f i c  d e g re e  o f  market power in  term s o f  market sh are  and 
c r o s s - p r i c e  e l a s t i c i t i e s  o f  demand, s e e  Landes and P osn er  [1981 , 





























































































(365 6q(6)p " Bole)
With this Inverse demand curve, firm l 's  marginal revenue Is
(37) MR, = p -  bl^ + aQ(8)_,]
and by e q u a t in g  f i r m  l ’ s m a rg in a l c o s t  t o  i t s  c o n j e c t u r a l  
m a rg in a l r e ven u e ,  f i r m  l ’ s d e g re e  o f  market power i s  seen  t o  be
P, " c i a * (1 -  a)s,(0)
(38) -i-B-----  =■ --------- s----------- -—
Pi eQ(6)p
where firm l 's  market share is defined in terms of the effective 
output with which variety 1 competes:
(39) S>(8) ■ q, A q _,
E qu a tion  (3 9 )  has i m p l i c a t i o n s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h o s e  o f  e q u a t io n  
( 3 3 ) .  Market sh a re  i s  an in d ex  o f  th e  d e g re e  o f  market power, 
a l b e i t  an in co m p le te  in d e x .  But an a d d i t i o n a l  i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  
(3 8 )  i s  t h a t  market share  sh ou ld  be measured r e l a t i v e  t o  th e  
p o r t i o n  o f  th e  market w ith  which  a d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  p ro d u c t  
e f f e c t i v e l y  com p etes ,  n o t  th e  e n t i r e  m a rk et . 20
If market share is measured with respect to the entire 
market rather than the portion of the market with which a variety 
competes, effective market share -  the market share which is 
relevant for the assessment of market power -  will be 
understated. The extent of the understatement will depend on the 
magnitude of 8 -  on the extent of product differentiation. 20
20. I t  i s  tem p tin g  t o  pursue  th e  developm ent o f  m odels  o f  
o l i g o p o l y  and p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  in  which  market sh are  i s  
d e f in e d  in  term s o f  revenue r a th e r  than q u a n t i t y  o r  e q u iv a l e n t  
q u a n t i ty  term s. F or  an a t tem p t ,  se e  C la rk e ,  D a v ie s ,  and Waterson 
[1 9 8 4 ] ,  T h e ir  e q u a t io n  (7 )  i s  an e x p r e s s io n  f o r  th e  f i r m -  
s p e c i f i c  d e g re e  o f  market power. I t  has th e  i m p l i c a t i o n  t h a t  th e  




























































































Table 1: s(0) For Various Values of s and 0
s .1 : .2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9
. 9 .11 .22 . 32 .43 .53 . 63 .72 .82 .91
. 8 . 12 . 24 . 35 . 45 . 56 . 65 . 74 . 83 . 92
.7 . 14 .26 . 38 . 49 . 59 . 68 . 77 .85 . 93
.6 . 16 .29 .42 . 53 . 63 .71 .30 .87 . 94
. 5 . 18 .33 . 46 . 57 . 67 .75 . 82 .89 . 95
. 4 .21 . 38 . 52 . 63 . 71 .79 .85 .91 . 96
. 3 .27 . 45 .59 .69 . 77 . 83 . 89 . 93 .97
. 2 . 35 . 56 . 68 . 77 . 83 . 88 . 92 . 95 . 98
. 1 .53 .71 . 81 . 86 . 91 .94 . 96 .98 .99
Note: table shows value of s(8) for various combinations of s
(columns) and 8 (rows).
Table 1 illustrates the relationship between market share 
and effective market share for varying degrees of product 
differentiation. The nine columns of Table 1 have market share 
increase, by ten-percentage point increments, from 10 to 90 per 
cent. The nine rows of Table 1 have 0 decrease, by decrements 
of one-tenth, from .9 (nearly complete standardization) to .1 
(nearly complete differentiation).
Effective market share rises, all else equal, as product 
differentiation increases -  as 0 falls. It is apparent that 
even firms with low market shares can have quite high effective 
market shares -  and therefore, high degrees of market power -  if 
product differentiation is sufficiently great. A firm with a 




























































































market share of over 50 per cent if 0 = .1. Firms with 
moderate market shares (10 to 30 per cent) will have effective 
market shares which are quite high if product differentiation is 
great (0 in the .4 to .1 range). Firms with intermediate 
market shares (40 to 60 per cent) will have quite high effective 
market shares in the presence of even moderate product 
differentiation (0 in the .7 to .4 range).
D. I m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  th e  Use o f  Market Share as an Index o f  
Market Power
C ou rts  have r e c o g n i z e d  t h a t  market power i s  a complex
phenomenon, r e f l e c t i n g  many a s p e c t s  o f  market s t r u c t u r e  and f i r m
co n d u c t .  But c o u r t s  have f o c u s e d  on market sh are  as an in d e x  o f
market power as a way o f  c l a r i f y i n g  p o l i c y  and s i m p l i f y i n g
a n t i t r u s t  p r o c e e d in g s .  The p o l i c y  i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s
p r e s e n te d  above  i s  th a t  market share  w i l l  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y
u n d e r s t a t e  th e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  market power, a l l  e l s e  e q u a l ,  in  th e
p r e s e n ce  o f  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .
I t  i s  sometimes su g g e s te d  t h a t  g e o g r a p h ic  markets sh ou ld  be
d e f in e d  v e ry  b r o a d ly  [Landes and P osn er ,  1981, p. 96 3 ] :
. . . i f  a d i s t a n t  s e l l e r  has some s a l e s  in  a l o c a l  market, a l l  
i t s  s a l e s ,  w herever  made, sh ou ld  be c o n s id e r e d  a p a r t  o f  
th a t  l o c a l  market f o r  p u rp o s e s  o f  com puting  th e  market share  
o f  a l o c a l  s e l l e r .
But l o c a t i o n  o f  s u p p l i e r  i s  a r e c o g n i z e d  b a s i s  f o r  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  (Cham berlin  [1933 , p. 56, qu oted  a b o v e ] ) .  U n less  
p r o d u c t s  a re  a b s o l u t e l y  s t a n d a r d iz e d  and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  c o s t s  are  
m in im a] , such an i n c l u s i v e  ap proach  t o  market d e f i n i t i o n  w i l l  
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  u n d e r s t a t e  e f f e c t i v e  market sh a re ,  b e ca u se  i t  w i l l  
i n c lu d e  in  th e  t o t a l  market u n i t s  o f  o u tp u t  which  do n o t  r e a l l y  




























































































I f  market, sh are  i s  t o  s e r v e  as a r e l i a b l e  index  o f  market 
power, c o u r t s  sh o u ld  examine " p r a c t i c a l  i n d i c i a "  o f  th e  e x t e n t  o f  
p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  -  th e  n atu re  and e x t e n t  o f  a d v e r t i s i n g  
and n o n - a d v e r t i s i n g  s a l e s  e f f o r t s  and p r o d u c t - d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  
r e s e a r c h  and d eve lopm en t.  Where p r a c t i c a l  i n d i c i a  s u g g e s t  th e  
im p ortan ce  o f  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,  c o u r t s  m ight f o l l o w  one o f  
two a l t e r n a t i v e  a p p ro a ch e s .  Markets might be d e f in e d  b r o a d ly ,  in  
which  c a s e  c o u r t s  sh ou ld  c o n c lu d e  t h a t  market power i s  l i k e l y  f o r  
market sh a re s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  lo w e r  than would be th e  c a s e  i f  
p r o d u c t s  were s t a n d a r d iz e d .  A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  m arkets c o u ld  be 
d e f in e d  q u i t e  n a rro w ly ,  w ith  a f i n d i n g  o f  market power o n ly  i f  
market sh are  i s  h ig h  in  a n arrow ly  d e f in e d  market. In any e v e n t ,  
th e  m ech an ica l  c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  market sh ares  w ith o u t  e v a lu a t i o n  o f  
th e  e x t e n t  o f  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  w i l l  r e s u l t  in  a f a l s e  
c e r t a i n t y  which  w i l l  o f t e n  f a i l  t o  f i n d  market power when market 
power i s  l i k e l y .
IV. P ro d u c t  D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  and Long-Run Market P er form ance
A. P rod u ct  D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  and Market S i z e
Equation (4) gives demand for variety i, given product 
differentiation, when all prices are positive. In symmetric
equilibrium, p( « p, and the price-deviation term on the 
right in (4) disappears. As product differentiation increases,
8 goes to zero, the fraction outside the braces on the right 
in (4) goes to one, and the demand curve for variety i (written 
for convenience in inverse form) approaches
(40) p( -  a -  bq(.
But t h i s  i s  i d e n t i c a l  in  form t o  th e  i n v e r s e  demand c u r v e  o f  




























































































d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  in c r e a s e s  in  th e  l i n e a r  demand model o f  p r o d u c t  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,  each  v a r i e t y  i n h e r i t s  a market f u l l y  as l a r g e  as 
th e  e n t i r e  s ta n d a r d . iz e d -p r o d u c t  market.
For some c l a s s e s  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  p r o d u c t s ,  i t  may w e l l  be 
th e  c a s e  t h a t  market s i z e  in c r e a s e s  as p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  
in c r e a s e s .  T h is  w i l l  be  th e  c a s e  when th e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  v a r i e t i e s  a t t r a c t s  m ain ly  new consumers i n t o  th e  
market. Examples might be r o c k  m usic  and c l a s s i c a l  m usic ,  o r  
H arlequ in  romances and p aperback  s c i e n c e  f i c t i o n  n o v e l s .  For 
o t h e r  c l a s s e s  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  p r o d u c t s ,  however,  t o t a l  market 
s i z e  i s  l i k e l y  t o  be  more o r  l e s s  f i x e d ,  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  th e  e x t e n t  
o f  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .  The market f o r  b r e a k f a s t  c e r e a l s ,  
f o r  example, may in c r e a s e  somewhat as th e  number o f  brands o f  
b r e a k f a s t  c e r e a l  in c r e a s e s ,  but s u r e ly  n ot  in  a o n e - t o - o n e  r a t i o .
It is interesting, therefore, to examine the impact of 
product differentiation on market performance for the case in 
which market size is fixed as the number of varieties increases.
From (4), if demand for variety in the flexible market case is
scaled down by - —* ^ so that demand for 
variety i is
we will have nq* • S if p -  c for all i.
Thus f o r  demand c u rv e s  o f  th e  form ( 4 1 ) ,  market s i z e  i s  
c o n s t a n t  in  th e  sen se  t h a t  t o t a l  q u a n t i t y  demanded, a t  a p r i c e  
equal t o  m arg in a l c o s t ,  i s  constant, as th e  d e g re e  o f  p r o d u c t  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  changes .  As w i l l  appear  p r e s e n t l y ,  when market
(41) q.




























































































f ix e d -m a r k e t  c a s e  i s  i d e n t i c a l  t o  th a t  o f  th e  s t a n d a r d iz e d -  
p r o d u c t  l i n e a r  demand model.  For demand c u r v e s  o f  th e  form (411 , 
market s i z e  i s  c o n s ta n t  in  th e  se n se  t h a t  o p t im a l  market 
p er form an ce  does  n o t  change as t h e  d e g re e  o f  p r o d u c t  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  changes .
Demand in  th e  f ix e d -m a r k e t  s i z e  model i s  a p r o p o r t i o n a l l y  
s ca le d -d o w n  v e r s i o n  o f  demand in  th e  f l e x i b l e - m a r k e t  s i z e  m odel.  
In th e  ab sen ce  o f  f i x e d  c o s t s ,  p r i c e  r e a c t i o n  c u r v e s  a re  
i d e n t i c a l  in  th e  two m od els ,  and q u a n t i t y - r e a c t i o n  c u r v e s  d i f f e r  
by th e  p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y  f a c t o r .  R e a c t io n  c u r v e s  w i l l  d i f f e r  in  
th e  p r e s e n ce  o f  f i x e d  c o s t s ,  s i n c e  shutdown r e g i o n s  w i l l  d i f f e r  
in  th e  two m od els .  For a f i x e d  number o f  f i r m s ,  e q u i l i b r iu m  
p r i c e s  a re  th e  same in  both  m odels ,  w h i le  e q u i l ib r iu m  o u tp u ts  and 
p r o f i t s  d i f f e r  by th e  p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y  f a c t o r .  S t r u c t u r e -  
per form an ce  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  which depend on r a t i o s  o f  o u tp u t  o r  o f  
p r o f i t  a re  t h e r e f o r e  u n a f f e c t e d  by t h e  m a r k e t - s i z e  p r o d u c t  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  when i t  ta k e s  the  p r o p o r t i o n a l  form 
m odeled h e r e .  T h is  in c l u d e s  th e  p r e v i o u s  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  
s t a b i l i t y  o f  n o n c o o p e r a t i v e  c o l l u s i o n  and th e  use o f  market share  
as an in d ex  o f  market power. The p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n - m a r k e t  
s i z e  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  however,  has i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  market 




























































































B. S h o r t - r u n /L o n g -ru n  E q u i l ib r iu m  w ith  S ta n d a r d is e d  P r o d u c t s 21 
L et th e  f i r m  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  be 
(42) CCq) = F + cq
The s h o r t - r u n  ( g iv e n  n) q u a n t i t y - s e t t i n g  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  w ith  
s t a n d a r d is e d  p r o d u c t s  i s
(43) n * 1
bS
Pqs * c *
The s h o r t - r u n  p r o f i t  o r  l o s s  o f  a s i n g l e  f i r m  i s
v 2
(44) •qs -  cK s  -  F -  b ( ï r l - r )  -
In th e  absen ce  o f  e n t r y  b a r r i e r s  and e n t r y - d e t e r r i n g  
b e h a v io r ,  e n try  sh ou ld  f o r c e  f i r m  p r o f i t  t o  z e r o  in  the  lo n g  run. 
The lo n g -r u n  q u a n t i t y - s e t t i n g  s ta n d a r d iz e d  p r o d u c t  e q u i l ib r iu m  i s





As th e  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  (4 2 )  e x h i b i t s  econom ies  o f  s c a l e  f o r  
a l l  q, th e  op t im a l  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  i s  t o  have a s i n g l e  p la n t  
prod uce  S u n i t s  o f  o u t p u t . 22 Optimal and lo n g - r u n  q u a n t i t y ­
s e t t i n g  market e q u i l i b r iu m  n e t  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  a re
21. These r e s u l t s  a re  w e l l  known, and a re  p r e s e n te d  f o r  
com parison  w ith  th e  p r o d u c t - d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  m odel.  For more 
com p le te  d i s c u s s i o n s ,  se e  Shubik [1980 ,  pp. 5 0 - 6 7 ] ;  Friedman 
[1983 , Chapter  2 ] ;  M artin  [1988a , pp. 104 -117 ;  and T i r o l e  [1988 ,
pp. 218 -221 .
22. If F is so great that n'* in (45) is less than 1, it is not
op
profitable to produce the product. If F is so large that NSWs 
in (46) is negative, it is not optimal to produce the product. 































































































r e s p e c t i v e l y .
C. P ro d u c t  D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n / Q u a n t i t y - S e t t i n g  Firms
F l e x i b l e  Market S iz e
The lo n g -r u n  q u a n t i t y - s e t t i n g  e q u i l i b r iu m  v a lu e s  are
p r ■ c + 'IbFr rtli
Comparing (4 5 )  and ( 4 7 ) ,  lo n g -r u n  e q u i l ib r iu m  p r i c e  and 
q u a n t i ty  a re  th e  same in  t h i s  model and th e  q u a n t i t y - s e t t i n g  
model w ith  s t a n d a r d iz e d  p r o d u c t s .  The r e l a t i o n  betw een  th e  l o n g -  
run e q u i l ib r iu m  number o f  v a r i e t i e s  w ith  and w ith o u t  p r o d u c t  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  i s
The equilibrium number of varieties with product differentiation 
is inversely related to 0, and rises as product differentiation increases.
In symmetric e q u i l i b r iu m ,  n e t  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  in  th e  n -  
v a r i e t y  l i n e a r  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  mode! i s 28
M axim ising (4 9 )  w ith  r e s p e c t  t o  n and q, one o b t a in s  th e  
op t im a l  v a lu e s  f o r  th e  p r o d u c t - d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  m odel:  23*
(48) 1
(49)
23. (4 9 )  i s  o b t a in e d  by summing in cr e m e n ta l  n e t  w e l f a r e  due t o
each  v a r i e t y ,  then  im p os in g  symmetry. See s p e c i f i c a l l y  Spence




























































































C50> V - - nIt- H I  "cm - 1 * e ( ^  - 1 ]
Comparing (47 )  and ( 5 0 ) ,  i t  i s  e v id e n t  t h a t  l o n g - r u n  
q u a n t i t y - s e t t i n g  market ou tp u t  p e r  v a r i e t y  i s  always l e s s  than 
o p t im a l  ou tp u t  p e r  v a r i e t y .  The lo n g -r u n  q u a n t i t y - s e t t i n g  market 
number o f  v a r i e t i e s  may be g r e a t e r  o r  l e s s  than th e  op t im a l  
number o f  v a r i e t i e s  (Spence [1 9 7 6 a ] ;  Mankiw and Whinston [ 1 9 8 6 ] ) .
F ix e d  Market S i z e
With demand c u r v e s  ( 4 1 ) ,  th e  s h o r t - r u n  market e q u i l ib r iu m  
v a lu e s  a re
(51) *,sr 1 -  (n -  1)6 S qqd ”  2 -  (n -  1)6 n
*,sr
C bS2 + (n - 1)0
The l o n g - r u n  number o f  f i r m s ,  which  makes p r o f i t - p e r  v a r i e t y  
z e r o ,  i s  a s o l u t i o n  o f  th e  c u b i c  e q u a t io n
2
(52) n3 -  2<2 e'  *»n2 ♦
(2 - 8)2 -  60^
8
n
(1 -  9)o‘
e2
where Although not in general susceptible to analytic
s o l u t i o n ,  (5 2 )  can be  s o lv e d  n u m e r i c a l ly .  (5 1 )  can then  be used 
t o  e v a lu a t e  th e  lo n g -r u n  e q u i l i b r iu m  o u tp u t  and p r i c e .
When market s i z e  i s  in v a r i a n t  t o  th e  d e g re e  o f  p r o d u c t  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,  n e t  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  i s  
(53) NSW*(n,q) = bnq(^S -  ^nq J - nF .
I t  f o l l o w s  im m edia te ly  from ( 53 )  th a t ^ 4
24. S u b s t i t u t e  Q = nq in  ( 53)  t o  r e p a r a m e te r i z e  NSW* as a 
f u n c t i o n  o f  Q and n. The r e s u l t  i s  maximized when Q = S, and i s  
a n e g a t iv e  f u n c t i o n  o f  n. n sh o u ld  thus be  made as sm all  as 




























































































In th e  f i x e d  market s i z e  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  model i t  i s  
op t im a l  t o  p r o d u c t  a s i n g l e  v a r i e t y  p r o d u c t  th e  amount, o f  th a t  
v a r i e t y  which  would c l e a r  th e  market a t  a p r i c e  equ a l  t o  marginal 
c o s t  (p r o v id e d  f i x e d  c o s t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  sm all  s o  t h a t  i t  i s  
op t im a l  t o  p rod u ce  at  a l l ) .
By t a k in g  a demand cu rv e  which i s  a w e ig h te d -a v e r a g e  o f  th e  
f i x e d -  and f l e x i b l e - m a r k e t  s i z e  demand c u r v e s ,  one o b t a in s  a 
model in  which  market s i z e ,  and th e  op t im a l  number o f  v a r i e t i e s ,  
expands as th e  d e g re e  o f  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  i n c r e a s e s ,  but 
l e s s  r a p id ly  than in  th e  f l e x i b l e - m a r k e t  s i z e  m odel.  The 
a n a l y s i s  which  f o l l o w s  f o c u s e s  on th e  p o l a r  c a s e s .
R e l a t i v e  Market P er form an ce25
Given th e  f u n c t i o n a l  form s o f  th e  demand and c o s t  f u n c t i o n s ,  
market p er form an ce  depends on f i x e d  c o s t  and th e  d e g re e  o f  
p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .  I n c r e a s e s  in  f i x e d  c o s t  ten d  t o  red u ce  
th e  e q u i l ib r iu m  number o f  v a r i e t i e s ,  w h i le  i n c r e a s e s  in  th e  
d e g re e  o f  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  ten d  t o  in c r e a s e  th e  
e q u i l i b r iu m  number o f  v a r i e t i e s .
Here I examine th e  r e l a t i v e  market p er form an ce  -  n e t  s o c i a l  
w e l f a r e  in lo n g -r u n  e q u i l ib r iu m  as a f r a c t i o n  o f  op t im a l  n e t  
s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  -  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  f i x e d  c o s t  and p r o d u c t  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .  ( 4 7 ) ,  (4 9 )  and (5 0 )  g e n e r a t e  r e s u l t s  f o r  th e
f l e x i b l e  market s i z e  model and ( 5 1 ) ,  (5 2 )  and (5 4 )  f o r  th e  f i x e d  
market s i z e  model.
25. The BASIC com puter  programs w hich  p ro d u ce  th e  n um erica l  




























































































T ab le 2: V a r i a b l e /F i x e d  Market S i z e  R e l a t i v e  Market 





1 2 .5 5 .0 7 .5 10
0 . 8 2 / 0 . 8 1 0 . 7 3 / 0 . 7 2 0 . 6 5 / 0 . 6 4 0 . 6 0 / 0 . 5 9 0 . 5 6 / 0 . 5 6
0 .7 5 0 . 9 0 / 0 . 7 8 0 . 8 4 / 0 . 7 0 0 . 7 6 / 0 . 6 0 0 . 7 0 / 0 . 5 5 0 . 6 4 / 0 . 5 2
0 .5 0 0 . 9 4 / 0 . 7 4 0 . 8 9 / 0 . 6 3 0 . 8 4 / 0 . 5 4 0 . 7 8 / 0 . 5 0 0 . 7 3 / 0 . 4 7
0 .2 5 0 . 9 6 / 0 . 6 6 0 . 9 3 / 0 . 5 3 0 . 8 8 / 0 . 4 5 0 . 8 3 / 0 . 4 2 0 . 7 7 / 0 . 4 1
0 .0 1 0 . 9 7 / 0 . 3 0 0 . 9 5 / 0 . 2 9 0 . 9 0 / 0 . 2 9 0 . 8 4 / 0 . 3 1 0 . 7 6 / 0 . 3 3
Notes : i n t e r c e p t i s  10, s l o p e i s  -  1. m a rg in a l c o s t i s  1; f i x e d
c o s t  and d e g re e  o f  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  v ary  as in d i c a t e d .
R e l a t i v e  market per form an ce  e q u a ls  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r iu m  n et  
s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  as a f r a c t i o n  o f  op t im a l  n e t  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e .
F i r s t  number g i v e s  r e l a t i v e  market p er form an ce  in  v a r i a b l e  market 
s i z e  model,  secon d  number g iv e s  r e l a t i v e  market p er form an ce  in  
f i x e d  market s i z e  m o d e l .
It is evident that the impact of product differentiation on 
market performance depends critically on whether or not market 
size increases as the degree of product differentiation 
increases. When market size rises with product differentiation, 
the market works well when 8 and F are small (toward the lower 
left-hand corner of Table 2). When F and 0 are low, there are 
many varieties, and each variety brings with it additional 
consumer surplus. Holding fixed cost constant, relative market 




























































































In contrast, when market size is invariant to the extent of 
product differentiation, the market works best when F is small 
and 6 large (toward the upper left-hand corner of Table 2).
When market size is fixed, relative market performance rises, for 
any level o f F, as products become more standardized (as 6 
rises). When market size is fixed, each additional variety means 
an additional social charge -  fixed co s t  -  against a constant 
potential consumers' surplus. Less product differentiation means 
fewer varieties and better market performance, holding F constant.
T ab le 3: V a r i a b l e /F i x e d  Market S i z e  Market 
Q u a n t i t y - s e t t i n g  O l i g o p o ly
Number o f F irm s ,
F = i 2 .5 5 .0 7 .5 10
0
0 .9 9 8 . 1 / 8 . 0 4 . 7 / 4 . 7 3 . 0 / 3 . 0 2 .3  / 2  . .3 1 . 9 / 1 . 8
0 .7 5 1 0 . 3 / 8 . 9 5 . 9 / 5 . 1 3 . 7 / 3 . 2 2 . 7 / 2 . 4 2 . 1 / 1 . 9
0 .5 0 1 5 /1 0 .3 8 . 4 / 5 . 7 5 . 0 / 3 . 5 3 . 6 / 2 . 5 2 . 7 / 2 . 0
0 .2 5 2 9 /1 3 .0 1 5 . 7 / 6 . 7 9 . 1 / 3 . 8 6 . 1 / 2 . 6 4 . 4 / 2 . 0
0 .0 1 7 0 1 /2 0 .1 3 7 0 /8 .1 2 0 3 /4 .0 1 3 0 /2 .7 86 /2 .0 .
T h is  d ia g n o s i s  i s  c o n f ir m e d  by Tab le  3, which compares the  
e q u i l i b r iu m  number o f  v a r i e t i e s  in  th e  f l e x i b l e  and f i x e d  market 
s i z e  m od els .  Where f l e x i b l e  market s i z e  r e l a t i v e  market 
p e r fo rm a n ce  i s  h ig h ,  th e  number o f  v a r i e t i e s  i s  h ig h e r ,  a l l  e l s e  
e q u a l .  Where f i x e d  market s i z e  r e l a t i v e  market p er form an ce  i s  




























































































B. P r i c e - S e t t i n g  Firms
I t  i s  o f t e n  th e  c a s e  t h a t  s t r u c t u r e - p e r f o r m a n c e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a re  d i f f e r e n t  in  q u a n t i ty —s e t t i n g  and in  p r i c e ­
s e t t i n g  m o d e l s .26 Thus i t  i s  o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  examine th e  
s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  th e  p r o d u c t - d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n / m a r k e t  p er form an ce  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  th e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  f i r m s ’ c h o i c e  v a r i a b l e .
F l e x i b l e  Market S i z e
The s h o r t - r u n  p r i c e - s e t t i n g  e q u i l i b r iu m  v a lu e s  a re
r 1 -  (n -  2)6 1  S sr
L 2 + On -  3)0 J 1 + (n -  1)0 pPd
1 - e
2 + (n -  3)9bS
The lo n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r iu m  number o f  f i r m s  i s  a s o l u t i o n  o f  
th e  c u b i c  e q u a t io n
,  s 7Û -  (2 -  38X4 -  50) -  oI (1 - 9X2 -  30)2 -  (1 -  29)0,
C56) n3 «• V  ♦ -------------------- 5-----------------^  ♦ --------------------------- 5------------------------- -  0y e e
where Op = (1 -  8)^p- . Numerical
solutions o f , (56), substituted in (55), yield long-run
equilibrium values for the flexible market size price-settin g
model.
F ix e d  Market S iz e
The s h o r t - r u n  p r i c e - s e t t i n g  e q u i l i b r iu m  v a lu e s  a re
(57) a*,sr = f  1 * tn...-.,218 IS15 J L 2 *  (n -  3)9 Jd Pd
1 -  8 
(n -  3)9bS
26. Cournot and B ertran d  m odels  o f  s t a n d a r d iz e d - p r o d u c t  
o l i g o p o l y  y i e l d  v e r y  p r e d i c t i o n s  about th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
market c o n c e n t r a t i o n  and market p er fo rm a n ce .  The im pact o f  
m ergers on market p er form an ce  a l s o  depends c r i t i c a l l y  on w hether  




























































































For g iv e n  n, th e  s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l ib r iu m  p r i c e  i s  the  same in  
th e  f l e x i b l e -  and f i x e d - s i z e  m arkets.  T h is  f o l l o w s  from th e  f a c t  
t h a t  th e  demand c u r v e s  in  th e  f i x e d - s i z e  market a re  
p r o p o r t i o n a l l y - s c a l e d  down v e r s i o n s  o f  th e  demand c u r v e s  in  the  
f l e x i b l e - s i ze market.
The c u b i c  e q u a t io n  which  de term in es  th e  lo n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r iu m  
number o f  f i r m s  i s
(58) 2(2 -  36) 2§ n
(2 - 3er
-  20  _2
By s u b s t i t u t i n g  n um erica l  s o l u t i o n s  o f  (5 8 )  i n t o  ( 5 7 ) ,  one 
o b t a in s  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l ib r iu m  v a lu e s  f o r  th e  f i x e d  market s i z e  
p r i c e - s e t t i n g  m o d e l .
Tab le 4: V a r i a b l e /F i x e d  Market S i z e  R e l a t i v e  Market 
P r i c e - s e t t i n g  o l i g o p o l y
P e r fo rm a n ce ,
F = 1 2 .5 5 .0 7 .5 10
0
0 .9 9 0 . 9 9 / 0 . 9 8  0 . 9 9 / 0 . 9 8 0 . 9 8 / 0 . 9 8 0 . 9 7 / 0 . 9 7 0 . 9 6 / 0 . 9 5
0 .7 5 0 . 9 8 / 0 . 8 9  0 . 9 6 / 0 . 8 4 0 . 9 3 / 0 . 7 9 0 . 8 9 / 0 . 7 5 0 . 8 4 / 0 . 7 1
0 .5 0 0 . 9 8 / 0 . 8 1  0 . 9 6 / 0 . 7 2 0 . 9 2 / 0 . 6 4 0 . 8 8 / 0 . 5 9 0 . 8 3 / 0 . 5 6
0 .2 5 0 . 9 8 / 0 . 6 9  0 . 9 5 / 0 . 5 8 0 . 9 1 / 0 . 4 9 0 . 8 6 / 0 . 4 5 0 . 8 1 / 0 , 4 3
0 .0 1 0 . 9 7 / 0 . 3 0  0 . 9 5 / 0 . 2 9 0 . 9 0 / 0 . 2 9 0 . 8 4 / 0 . 3 1 0 . 7 6 / 0 . 3 4
Notes : i n t e r c e p t  i s  10, s l o p e i s  -  1, m arg inal c o s t i s  1 ; f  ix e d
c o s t and d e g re e  o f  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n vary  as i n d i c a t e d .
F i r s t  number g i v e s  r e l a t i v e  market p er form an ce  in  v a r i a b l e  market 
s i z e  m odel,  secon d  number g iv e s  r e l a t i v e  market p e r fo rm a n ce  in  
f i x e d  market s i z e  model.
R e l a t i v e  Market Perform ance
T ab le  4 compares r e l a t i v e  market per form an ce  in  f l e x i b l e -  
and f ix e d -m a r k e t  s i z e  p r i c e - s e t t i n g  o l i g o p o l y .  For th e  f i x e d -  




























































































r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  shown in  T ab le  2 f o r  q u a n t i t y ­
s e t t i n g  o l i g o p o l y .  In  th e  f i x e d - s i z e  p r i c e - s e t t i n g  model, 
r e l a t i v e  market p e r form an ce  f a l l s ,  h o ld in g  f i x e d  c o s t  c o n s t a n t ,  
as  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  in c r e a s e s .
For the flexib le-size model, the product-differentiation 
market performance relationship in Table 4 is opposite that of 
Table 1. For given F and 0, flexible market size relative 
market performance is higher in Table 4 than in Table 1, unless 
0 is quite small. Further, holding F constant, relative 
market performance in the p rice -settin g  market falls as 0 
falls, while in Table 1 relative market performance rises as 0 
falls [F constant).
These relationships reflect the fact that price-setting  
oligopoly  is more efficient that quantity-setting oligopoly  
fVives [1985]). Comparing Tables 3 and 5, there are fewer 
varieties in long-run equilibrium, for given F and 6, when 
firms set prices than when firms set quantities. In the fixed
T ab le  5: V a r i a b l e /F i x e d  Market S i z e  Market Number o f  Firms
P r i c e - s e t t i n g  o l i g o p o l y
F = i 2 .5 5 .0 7 .5 10
0
0 .9 9 1 . 5 / 1 . 5 1 . 2 / 1 . 2 1 . 1 / 1 . 1 1 . 0 7 / 1 . 0 7  1 . 0 5 / 1 . 0 5
0 .7 5 5 . 8 / 5 . 2 3 . 6 / 3 . 3 2 . 5 / 2 . 3 2 . 0 / 1 . 9 1 . 7 / 1 . 6
0 .5 0 1 1 . 2 / 8 . 0 6 . 5 / 4 . 7 4 . 1 / 3 . 0 3 . 0 / 2 . 3 2 . 4 / 1 . 8
0 .2 5 2 5 . 6 / 1 1 . 9 1 4 . 1 / 6 . 3 8 . 3 / 3 . 7 5 . 7 / 2 . 6 4 . 1 / 2 . 0
0 .0 1 6 9 9 /2 0 .1 3 6 9 /8 .1 2 0 3 /4 .0 1 2 9 /2 .7 8 5 /2 .0
market.-- s i z e  model, th e  market number o f v a r i e t i e s produced  i s




























































































P ro d u c in g  fe w e r  v a r i e t i e s  r ed u ces  t h i s  i n e f f i c i e n c y ,  im proves 
market p e r fo rm a n ce ,  and r e e n f o r c e s  th e  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n -  
r e l a t i v e  market p er form an ce  d e p i c t e d  in  T ab le  2.
There are fewer varieties produced when firms set prices in 
the flex ib le-size  market as well. When 6 is large, so many 
fewer varieties are produced in price-settin g  oligopoly  that 
relative market performance exceeds any levels reported in Table 
1. As 0 falls, the number o f varieties increases, although 
always less in Table 5 than in Table 3. As 6 falls and the 
number of varieties produced in flexible market size equilibrium 
increases, relative market performance in the price-settin g  





























































































V. F in a l  Remarks
P ro d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  has fundamental and s u b t l e  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  o l i g o p o l i s t i c  market p er fo rm a n ce .  Because 
p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  means good s  a re  im p e r f e c t  s u b s t i t u t e s ,  
market share  i s  b ia s e d  downward as an in dex  o f  market power. 
Because p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  r e d u ce s  th e  g a in  t o  d e p a r t in g  
from a n o n c o o p e r a t i v e ly  c o l l u s i v e  e q u i l ib r iu m ,  i n c r e a s e s  in  
p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  in c r e a s e  th e  l i k e l i h o o d  t h a t  such 
e q u i l i b r i a  w i l l  be  s u s t a i n a b le ,  a l l  e l s e  e q u a l .
In th e  l o n g - r u n ,  in c r e a s e s  in  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  worsen 
r e l a t i v e  market per form an ce  in  markets where f i r m s  s e t  p r i c e .  
I n c r e a s e s  in  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  improve market p er form an ce  
i f  f i r m s  s e t  q u a n t i t i e s  and market s i z e  expands w ith  th e  d e g re e  
o f  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n -  I f  f i r m s  s e t  q u a n t i t i e s  and market 
s i z e  i s  in v a r i a n t  t o  th e  d e g re e  o f  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,  then 
in c r e a s e s  in  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  worsen r e l a t i v e  market
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